| Valence politics H Evrenk, RD Congleton, B Grofman, S Voigt The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1, 266, 2018 | 16 | 2018 |
| Social interactions in voting behavior: distinguishing between strategic voting and the bandwagon effect H Evrenk, CY Sher Public Choice 162, 405-423, 2015 | 15 | 2015 |
| Why a clean politician supports dirty politics: A game-theoretical explanation for the persistence of political corruption H Evrenk Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 80 (3), 498-510, 2011 | 15 | 2011 |
| Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: Quality of legislature under different selectorates H Evrenk, T Lambie-Hanson, Y Xu European Journal of Political Economy 29, 168-182, 2013 | 12 | 2013 |
| Three-candidate spatial competition when candidates have valence: stochastic voting H Evrenk, D Kha Public Choice 147, 421-438, 2011 | 7* | 2011 |
| A duopoly model of political agency with applications to anti-corruption reform H Evrenk The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics 9 (1), 0000102202193517041475, 2009 | 6* | 2009 |
| Three-candidate competition when candidates have valence: the base case H Evrenk Social Choice and Welfare 32 (1), 157-168, 2009 | 6 | 2009 |
| Political economy of anti-corruption reforms H Evrenk Boston University, 2005 | 5 | 2005 |
| An exercise in political economy of tax reform H Evrenk Economics Letters 105 (1), 81-82, 2009 | 4* | 2009 |
| Ignorance or trade-off? Testing three explanations for the re-election of corrupt politicians using data from an embedded survey in Turkey MK Doğan, H Evrenk Turkish Studies 22 (3), 331-356, 2021 | 3 | 2021 |
| Regulation through a revenue contest H Evrenk, EÜ Zenginobuz Journal of Economics 99, 211-237, 2010 | 3 | 2010 |
| Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization H Evrenk Suffolk University, Department of Economics Working Papers, 2010 | 2 | 2010 |
| A game-theoretic explanation for the persistence of political corruption H Evrenk Suffolk University, Department of Economics Working Papers, 2008 | 2 | 2008 |
| Mackerels in the moonlight: A model of corrupt politicians H Evrenk Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings, 2004 | 1 | 2004 |
| Yerel ve Genel Seçimlerde Yolsuzluğun Oy Verme Davranışına Etkileri MK DOĞAN, H Evrenk Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 75 (3), 871-898, 2020 | | 2020 |
| Yolsuzluk Yapan Seçilmiş Politikacılara Tekrar Oy Verilmesinin Sebeplerinin Belirlenmesi H EVRENK, MK DOĞAN | | 2017 |
| Designing a leaky bucket: Meltzer and Richard (1981) with endogenous ineffi ciency in redistributive institutions AF Aysan, H Evrenk | | 2015 |
| Party-Bosses vs. Party-Primaries: Quality of the Legislature under Different Selectorates T Lambie-Hanson, H Evrenk, Y Xu | | 2013 |
| Submission Number: PET11-11-00117 T Lambie-hanson, H Evrenk | | 2011 |
| Third parties in equilibrium: comment and correction H Evrenk Public Choice 139, 121-124, 2009 | | 2009 |
Timothy Lambie-HansonHaverford CollegeEmail verificata su haverford.edu
