Demand reduction and inefficiency in multi-unit auctions LM Ausubel, P Cramton, M Pycia, M Rostek, M Weretka The Review of Economic Studies 81 (4), 1366-1400, 2014 | 941* | 2014 |

Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation M Pycia Econometrica 80 (1), 323-362, 2012 | 158* | 2012 |

Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources M Pycia, MU Ünver Theoretical Economics 12 (1), 287-329, 2017 | 112* | 2017 |

Dynamic inconsistency and self-control: A planner–doer interpretation R Benabou, M Pycia Economics Letters 77 (3), 419-424, 2002 | 109 | 2002 |

Ordinal efficiency, fairness, and incentives in large markets Q Liu, M Pycia Fairness, and Incentives in Large Markets (August 1, 2016), 2016 | 81 | 2016 |

Outside options and the failure of the Coase conjecture S Board, M Pycia American Economic Review 104 (2), 656-71, 2014 | 50 | 2014 |

Matching with externalities M Pycia, MB Yenmez Available at SSRN 2475468, 2015 | 32 | 2015 |

Decomposing random mechanisms M Pycia, MU Ünver Journal of Mathematical Economics 61, 21-33, 2015 | 25 | 2015 |

Stochastic vs deterministic mechanisms in multidimensional screening M Pycia Technical report, MIT.[893, 908, 912], 2006 | 23 | 2006 |

Manipulability of stable mechanisms P Chen, M Egesdal, M Pycia, MB Yenmez American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 8 (2), 202-14, 2016 | 22* | 2016 |

Obvious dominance and random priority M Pycia, P Troyan | 21 | 2018 |

Efficient bilateral trade R Garratt, M Pycia Working paper, available at SSRN 2444279.[975], 2015 | 21 | 2015 |

American Economic Journal M Elsby, R Micheals, G Solon Macroeconomics 1 (1), 2009 | 21* | 2009 |

Obvious Dominance and Random Priority M Pycia, P Troyan http://pycia.bol.ucla.edu/pycia-troyan-rsd.pdf, 0 | 21* | |

A pseudo-market approach to allocation with priorities Y He, A Miralles, M Pycia, J Yan American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10 (3), 272-314, 2018 | 20 | 2018 |

The cost of ordinality M Pycia Available at SSRN 2460511, 2014 | 18 | 2014 |

Vouchers for future kidney transplants to overcome “chronological incompatibility” between living donors and recipients JL Veale, AM Capron, N Nassiri, G Danovitch, HA Gritsch, A Waterman, ... Transplantation 101 (9), 2115-2119, 2017 | 14 | 2017 |

Pay-as-bid: Selling divisible goods M Pycia, K Woodward | 13* | 2016 |

A direct proof of the s-Hölder continuity of Breckner s-convex functions M Pycia aequationes mathematicae 61 (1-2), 128-130, 2001 | 12 | 2001 |

Welfare-maximizing assignment of agents to hierarchical positions I Hafalir, A Miralles Journal of Mathematical Economics 61, 253-270, 2015 | 11 | 2015 |