Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness J Dana, RA Weber, JX Kuang Economic Theory 33 (1), 67-80, 2007 | 1743 | 2007 |
Identifying social norms using coordination games: Why does dictator game sharing vary? E Krupka, R Weber Journal of the European Economic Association, 2013 | 1018 | 2013 |
Cultural conflict and merger failure: An experimental approach RA Weber, CF Camerer Management Science, 400-415, 2003 | 940 | 2003 |
Sorting in experiments with application to social preferences EP Lazear, U Malmendier, RA Weber American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4 (1), 136-163, 2012 | 566* | 2012 |
Seeking the roots of entrepreneurship: Insights from behavioral economics T Åstebro, H Herz, R Nanda, RA Weber Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (3), 49-70, 2014 | 426 | 2014 |
Self-interest through delegation: An additional rationale for the principal-agent relationship JR Hamman, G Loewenstein, RA Weber American Economic Review 100 (4), 1826, 2010 | 425 | 2010 |
The focusing and informational effects of norms on pro-social behavior E Krupka, RA Weber Journal of Economic Psychology 30 (3), 307-320, 2009 | 391 | 2009 |
Assessing the robustness of power posing: No effect on hormones and risk tolerance in a large sample of men and women E Ranehill, A Dreber, M Johannesson, S Leiberg, S Sul, RA Weber Psychological science 26 (5), 653-656, 2015 | 337 | 2015 |
The illusion of leadership: Misattribution of cause in coordination games R Weber, C Camerer, Y Rottenstreich, M Knez Organization Science, 582-598, 2001 | 311 | 2001 |
Do markets erode social responsibility? B Bartling, RA Weber, L Yao The Quarterly Journal of Economics 130 (1), 219-266, 2015 | 303 | 2015 |
Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups R Weber American Economic Revew 96 (1), 114-126, 2006 | 298 | 2006 |
Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior EC Haisley, RA Weber Games and Economic Behavior 68 (2), 614-625, 2010 | 263 | 2010 |
Motivated Bayesians: Feeling moral while acting egoistically F Gino, MI Norton, RA Weber Journal of Economic Perspectives 30 (3), 189-212, 2016 | 221 | 2016 |
'Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game RA Weber Games and Economic Behavior 44 (1), 134-144, 2003 | 217 | 2003 |
The econometrics and behavioral economics of escalation of commitment: A re-examination of Staw and Hoang’s NBA data CF Camerer, RA Weber Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 39 (1), 59-82, 1999 | 213 | 1999 |
On the persistence of strategic sophistication S Georganas, PJ Healy, RA Weber Journal of Economic Theory 159, 369-400, 2015 | 186* | 2015 |
An Experimental Investigation of Electoral Delegation and the Provision of Public Goods JR Hamman, RA Weber, J Woon American Journal of Political Science, 2011 | 168 | 2011 |
Timing and virtual observability in ultimatum bargaining and “weak link” coordination games RA Weber, CF Camerer, M Knez Experimental Economics 7 (1), 25-48, 2004 | 154* | 2004 |
Legitimacy, communication, and leadership in the turnaround game J Brandts, DJ Cooper, RA Weber Management Science 61 (11), 2627-2645, 2015 | 149 | 2015 |
The effects of payoff magnitude and heterogeneity on behavior in 2x2 games with unique mixed strategy equilibria RD McKelvey, TR Palfrey, RA Weber Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 42 (4), 523-548, 2000 | 133 | 2000 |