David E. Lewis
David E. Lewis
Rebecca Webb Wilson University Distinguished Professor, Vanderbilt University
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Zitiert von
Zitiert von
The politics of presidential appointments: Political control and bureaucratic performance
DE Lewis
Princeton University Press, 2010
Presidents and the politics of agency design: Political insulation in the United States government bureaucracy, 1946-1997
DE Lewis
Stanford University Press, 2004
Expert opinion, agency characteristics, and agency preferences
JD Clinton, DE Lewis
Political Analysis 16 (1), 3-20, 2008
Testing Pendleton's premise: Do political appointees make worse bureaucrats?
DE Lewis
The Journal of Politics 69 (4), 1073-1088, 2007
Does performance budgeting work? An examination of the office of management and budget’s PART scores
JB Gilmour, DE Lewis
Public Administration Review 66 (5), 742-752, 2006
Separated powers in the United States: The ideology of agencies, presidents, and congress
JD Clinton, A Bertelli, CR Grose, DE Lewis, DC Nixon
American Journal of Political Science 56 (2), 341-354, 2012
The politics of agency termination: Confronting the myth of agency immortality
DE Lewis
The Journal of Politics 64 (1), 89-107, 2002
Toward a broader understanding of presidential power: A reevaluation of the two presidencies thesis
B Canes-Wrone, WG Howell, DE Lewis
The Journal of Politics 70 (1), 1-16, 2008
Not-so independent agencies: Party polarization and the limits of institutional design
N Devins, DE Lewis
BUL rev. 88, 459, 2008
Agencies by presidential design
WG Howell, DE Lewis
The Journal of Politics 64 (4), 1095-1114, 2002
Political appointments, civil service systems, and bureaucratic competence: Organizational balancing and executive branch revenue forecasts in the American states
GA Krause, DE Lewis, JW Douglas
American Journal of Political Science 50 (3), 770-787, 2006
Assessing performance budgeting at OMB: The influence of politics, performance, and program size
JB Gilmour, DE Lewis
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (2), 169-186, 2006
The consequences of presidential patronage for federal agency performance
N Gallo, DE Lewis
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22 (2), 219-243, 2012
Political appointees and the competence of federal program management
JB Gilmour, DE Lewis
American Politics Research 34 (1), 22-50, 2006
Presidents and patronage
GE Hollibaugh Jr, G Horton, DE Lewis
American Journal of Political Science 58 (4), 1024-1042, 2014
Revisiting the administrative presidency: Policy, patronage, and agency competence
DE Lewis
Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (1), 60-73, 2009
Presidential appointments and personnel
DE Lewis
Annual Review of Political Science 14 (1), 47-66, 2011
Political learning from rare events: Poisson inference, fiscal constraints, and the lifetime of bureaus
DP Carpenter, DE Lewis
Political Analysis 12 (3), 201-232, 2004
Influencing the bureaucracy: The irony of congressional oversight
JD Clinton, DE Lewis, JL Selin
American Journal of Political Science 58 (2), 387-401, 2014
The adverse consequences of the politics of agency design for presidential management in the United States: The relative durability of insulated agencies
DE Lewis
British Journal of Political Science 34 (3), 377-404, 2004
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